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Notes
The Government Can Read Your Mind:
Can the Constitution Stop It?
Mara Boundy
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”) technology produces a fourdimensional map of brain activity, such as perception, memory, emotion, and movement.
fMRI scans track the flow of blood to the various regions of the brain in real time and
reveal the subject’s response to particular stimulus. For example, an fMRI scan might
reveal blood flow to a subject’s memory center in response to a picture of the house in
which she was raised. On the one hand, this technology seems to produce a model of a
physical attribute and offer insight into the workings of the human brain. On the other,
fMRI scans seem to read our minds and disclose our thoughts. The full range of
applications of fMRI technology is just emerging, but proponents have already sought its
admission in court as a type of lie detector or credibility builder. If fMRI scans are
incorporated into the government’s investigatory process, constitutional safeguards
should be in place to protect the fundamental right of privacy and an individual’s
freedom to decide whether to assist the state. This Note proposes that the results of fMRI
scans are testimonial evidence: first, because the scans reveal the subject’s knowledge or
beliefs, and second, because this classification ensures that fMRI scan results are afforded
the protection of the Fifth Amendment. If fMRI scans are privileged under the Fifth
Amendment, the government cannot compel an individual to submit to the scan and
reveal the contents of her mind.

 J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A., Trinity College.
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Introduction
In George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the Thought Police
monitor the thoughts of citizens, trolling for any hint of forbidden
1
viewpoints. In 2012, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“fMRI”)
of the brain may accomplish similar ends. Developed to aid cognitive
neuroscientists in understanding which parts of the human brain are
responsible for functions such as memory, speech, and perception, fMRI
brain scans are able to track, in real time, the flow of blood to the various
2
parts of the brain. The fMRI scan’s ability to reveal neural substrates of
perception, emotion, and movement, as opposed to mere structure,
differentiates fMRI from other brain imaging techniques like the CT
3
scan. The imaging reveals the distinct areas to which the subject’s blood
flows “when making a movement, thinking of a loved one, or telling a
4
lie.”
Although fMRI was developed for diagnostic purposes, its future
use has the potential to be more far-reaching. Some private firms already
offer fMRI brain scans to clients who seek risk definition, fraud
5
detection, or more accurate consumer research. In addition, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, a primary innovation engine of the
6
Department of Defense, is also investigating the uses of fMRI brain scans.
1. See generally George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (2011).
2. See generally Scott A. Huettel et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (2d ed.
2008).
3. Richard Robinson, fMRI Beyond the Clinic: Will It Ever Be Ready for Prime Time?, 2 PLoS
Biology 715, 715 (2004).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., No Lie MRI, Inc., http://noliemri.com/customers/Overview.htm (last visited July 1,
2012); Mindsign Neuromarketing, http://mindsignonline.com/ (last visited July 1, 2012).
6. DARPA’s budgets for fiscal years 2007–2010 list projects involving fMRI. Def. Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates:
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide: Vol. I—Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency 213–15 (2009); Def. Advanced Research Projects Agency.
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In a post-9/11 world, where the boundaries of personal liberty are in
constant tension with the goals of national security, it is easy to envision
the governmental use of fMRI brain scans as a quick and efficient way of
7
identifying terror suspects. This Note addresses whether the use of fMRI
brain scanning in the investigatory process triggers safeguards sufficient
8
to protect an individual’s constitutional rights. Specifically, given the
nuanced information revealed by the scans, would this type of evidence
constitute testimony and warrant Miranda warnings and the protection of
the Fifth Amendment? Conversely, would the results of an fMRI scan be
mere physical evidence that is untethered from constitutional protections
and able to be compelled of any government detainee?

I. Lie Back, Relax, and Let Us Extract Your Testimony
fMRI maps human brain function by measuring the brain’s blood
9
flow and oxygenation in conjunction with mental operations. Like
traditional magnetic resonance imaging, a magnet causes molecules of the
10
subject’s body, mainly hydrogen, to align with a magnetic field. Each
mental process, from movement to speech to perception, corresponds to
11
an increased flow of blood to particular areas in the brain. This blood
carries more oxygen, which stimulates the magnetic properties of the
region and increases the signal that the magnetic resonance imaging
12
machine can detect. The fMRI is distinguishable from traditional
magnetic resonance imaging technology, such as CT scans, because it
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates: Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation, Defense-Wide: Vol. I—Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 14–15
(2008). DARPA also funded a study that resulted in the 2005 publication Telling Truth from Lie in
Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI. Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie
in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 Hum. Brain Mapping 262, 271 (2005).
7. In 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the
Pentagon, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
Department of Homeland Security to determine whether and how the agencies planned to use
technologies such as fMRI brain scans. ACLU Seeks Information About Government Use of Brain
Scanners in Interrogations, Am. Civil Liberties Union (June 28, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/
technology-and-liberty/aclu-seeks-information-about-government-use-brain-scanners-interrogations.
8. This Note considers the implications of admitting fMRI brain scans into court. It should be
noted that fMRI brain scans have not yet been deemed reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
and they must satisfy the Frye and/or Daubert tests for admissibility of scientific evidence. See Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589–92 (1993).
9. See generally Heuttel et al., supra note 2.
10. Edson Amaro Jr. & Gareth J. Barker, Study Design in fMRI: Basic Principles, 60 Brain &
Cognition 220, 221 (2006).
11. Randy L. Buckner & Jessica M. Logan, Functional Neuroimaging Methods: PET and fMRI, in
Handbook of Functional Neuroimaging of Cognition 27, 28 (Roberto Cabeza & Alan Kingstone
eds., 2001).
12. Id.; N.F. Ramsey et al., Functional MRI Experiments: Acquisition, Analysis and Interpretation
of Data, 12 European Neuropsychopharmacology 517, 519 (2002).
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produces a four-dimensional map of brain activity. For example, in
response to particular stimuli, such as photographs, the recitation of facts,
or questioning, the fMRI tracks the real-time flow of blood to the various
14
regions of the brain responsible for each mental activity. This tracking
results in an fMRI scan that reveals which mental process a subject has in
response to each stimulus. The real-time scan of a brain perceiving new
information looks different than a scan of a brain remembering or
15
perceiving information with which it is familiar. In other words, if a
particular subject is shown a photograph of a person who is unknown to
the subject, the brain scan will look different than it would if the subject
knows the person.
The fMRI has the potential to become an advanced and reliable
16
polygraph test. Although the reliability of fMRI scans may not yet meet
17
the standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, investigating the
18
potential constitutional implications of their use is still imperative. The
constitutional rights implicated by fMRI scans, especially the protection

13. Buckner & Logan, supra note 11, at 32 (noting that images of the whole brain can be acquired
in two seconds); Ramsey et al., supra note 12, at 518 (“The series of scans is stored as a time-series of
3D volumes . . . .”).
14. Buckner & Logan, supra note 11, at 32–33 (discussing options for study designs and
corresponding efficacies).
15. Most often, the fMRI scans are run in batches and are used for comparative purposes.
Matthew Baptiste Holloway, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of Brain Activity
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 Temp. J. Sci. Tech & Envtl. L. 141, 148 (2008).
Sometimes scans of different subjects are compared to study differences in brain activity between
different groups of subjects. Id. “[M]eaningful results,” however, “have been detected on the singlesubject level. . . . [and fMRI can] be a useful tool for the forensic analysis of criminal suspects.” Id.
16. See generally Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation Jurisprudence?,
33 Am. J.L. & Med. 341 (2007) (analyzing the constitutional issues implicated by fMRI technology and
arguing for a cautious approach in admitting fMRI evidence due to its privacy implications).
17. The use of fMRI scans in litigation is limited because of the novelty of the technology. As the
Court noted in Daubert and as is reflected in the amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to be
admissible the fMRI must prove a reliable application to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702;
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993). For example, in United States v.
Saelee, the District Court of Alaska excluded testimony by a handwriting expert because, although the
expert could identify undisguised handwriting, the evidence failed to show that the handwriting at
issue was in fact undisguised and unaltered, and the proponent offered no evidence as to how any
disguise or variation might have affected the expert’s error rate. 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 (D. Alaska
2001). In Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, the state was allowed to admit results of an
fMRI scan in an attempt to demonstrate how exposure to media violence—namely, the violent video
games at issue in that case—affects brain activity. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Conversely, in United States v. Semrau, a magistrate judge excluded an fMRI scan offered to bolster
the credibility of a testifying witness and to demonstrate that he did not commit fraud because it did
not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. No. 07-1004 M1/P, 2010 WL 6845092,
at *16 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). The Semrau judge rejected the fMRI scan specifically because it
found that the error rate of real-world applications could not be calculated based on fMRI use in
laboratories. Id. at *10–11.
18. Thompson, supra note 16, at 342–44.
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against self-incrimination, are weighty enough to tip the balance in favor of
19
a preemptive analysis of the admissibility of fMRI scans. The Supreme
Court has noted time and again that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment
20
is to protect the privacy inherent in the workings of an individual’s mind.
History has taught that without this essential privilege a government can
abuse its powers and seek to use force, threats, and pressure to obtain
21
information that would not have been voluntarily given. The evidence
gleaned from excessive interrogatory pressure undermines the reliability of
22
the judicial process. Thus, procedural and constitutional safeguards are
essential to ensure the efficacy of our court system. It is imperative that we
continue to evaluate the applicability and sufficiency of these safeguards as
technology advances.

II. Brain Scans and the Constitution
A defendant can be compelled to produce material evidence that is
incriminating. Fingerprints, blood samples, voice exemplars, handwriting
specimens, or other items of physical evidence may be extracted from a
defendant against his will. But can he be compelled to use his mind to
assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I think not.
23
—Justice John Paul Stevens

Because an fMRI brain scan reveals the mental reaction of a subject
in response to a particular stimulus—for example, recognition in response
to a picture—the scan necessarily implicates an individual’s right not to
reveal that information, the fact of the recognition. The Supreme Court
has consistently affirmed the Fifth Amendment’s provision that no person
24
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The Fifth Amendment
is designed to insulate individuals from the “cruel trilemma” of selfincrimination, perjury, or contempt in the face of interrogatory pressure by
25
the state. This fundamental privilege protects citizens from torture and
26
compulsion during interrogation. Devices that enable the government to
access information that would ordinarily have to be offered voluntarily by
an individual allow the government to circumvent this integral protection.
19. Id. at 344.
20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
460 (1966); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
21. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (“Historically, the privilege sprang from
an abhorrence of governmental assault against the single individual accused of crime and the
temptation on the part of the State to resort to the expedient of compelling incriminating evidence
from one’s own mouth.”).
22. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
23. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–38 (2000).
24. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V; Doe II, 487 U.S. at 210.
25. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597.
26. Couch, 409 U.S. at 327.
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It is imperative, therefore, that the law progress as quickly as technology
advances.
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona
established a respect for “the inviolability of the human personality” that
“demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce
27
the evidence against him by its own independent labors.” In Schmerber
28
v. California, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects
the accused from testifying against himself or providing the state with
“evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,” unless the
29
government provides appropriate constitutional safeguards. Evidence
that is protected under the Fifth Amendment requires the prophylactic
Miranda warning, which can only be waived voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently, so that the “inherently compelling pressures” of interrogation
do not “undermine the individual’s will to resist . . . [or] compel him to
30
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” However, the Fifth
Amendment, and therefore Miranda, only protects evidence that is
31
(1) testimonial, (2) compelled, and (3) incriminating. fMRI scans blur the
lines of traditional evidentiary distinctions and, in so doing, call into
question the effectiveness of these safeguards.
A. A Cruel Trilemma
The fMRI brain scan produces testimonial evidence because it
forces the participant “to disclose the contents of his own mind” and to
32
reveal incriminating information. The nature of the evidence revealed
by fMRI brain scans differentiates it from mere physical evidence. Physical
evidence is limited to “an identifying physical characteristic” of an
individual, such as a handwriting exemplar, a blood sample, or
33
fingerprint. Physical evidence is distinct from testimonial evidence and

27. 384 U.S. at 460.
28. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that the compulsion of a blood test in a hospital from a
seemingly intoxicated driver did not involve any testimonial compulsion or forced communication by
the driver and therefore did not infringe upon his Fifth Amendment right).
29. Id. at 761.
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
31. This dispositive, three-prong test was promulgated by the Supreme Court in Doe v. United
States (Doe II). 487 U.S. 201, 207 (1987). The Court has since applied it consistently when analyzing
whether evidence is testimonial in nature and thus privileged under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination applies to acts that imply assertions of fact.”); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–
38 (2000) (“[T]o be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate
a factual assertion or disclose information.”).
32. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). For a discussion of why fMRI brain scans
constitute incriminating evidence, see infra Part II.C.
33. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
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not afforded the protections of the Fifth Amendment because physical
34
evidence does not communicate personal beliefs or knowledge of facts.
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court discussed the
admissibility of a blood sample, taken in a hospital, which showed the
35
patient-driver’s blood alcohol level was above the state limit. The
defendant alleged that the admissibility of the analysis of the blood test
36
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The
Court noted that the driver’s self-incrimination was irrelevant because
the evidence consisted only of the chemical analysis of his blood and
37
contained no testimony or communication. The Court distinguished the
physical nature of the blood sample from the communicative nature of
38
testimonial evidence. Relying on Holt v. United States, the Court found
that the Fifth Amendment prohibition of compelled communication does
not preclude using the “body as evidence when it may be material,” and
to hold otherwise would “forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare
39
his features with a photograph in proof.” Thus, in Schmerber, because
the blood sample was material to the issue in dispute, contained no
testimonial component, and was merely a physical sample of the driver, it
did not implicate the protections of the Fifth Amendment. The Court
recognized that federal and state courts had declined to extend the Fifth
Amendment to “fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to
write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a
40
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” Ultimately, the Court
distinguished communication and testimony, the latter being privileged
from “compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real
41
or physical evidence.’”
Just a year after Schmerber, the Court again analyzed how physical
evidence is distinct from testimony and why it is not afforded the
42
protections of the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Wade, the
defendant argued that having to stand in a lineup and speak words heard
by witnesses to a robbery violated his Fifth Amendment right against

34. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990) (citing Doe II, 487 U.S. at 210–11).
35. 384 U.S. at 758–59.
36. Id. at 759. The defendant also raised other constitutional issues, but those are not relevant to
the current inquiry.
37. Id. at 765.
38. Id. at 761.
39. Id. at 763 (quoting Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910)). In Holt, the Court
found that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when he was compelled to put
on a blouse to see if it fit. Holt, 218 U.S. at 252–53.
40. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
41. Id.
42. See generally Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
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self-incrimination. The Court noted that the lineup was an analysis of a
physical feature of the defendant’s body, identification of which was
44
material to the case. Relying on Holt and Schmerber, the Court found
that compelling the defendant to speak the words purportedly uttered by
the robber—in essence to give a sample of his voice—did not constitute
45
government compulsion of testimony. Rather, Wade was merely
46
“required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic.”
In Gilbert v. California, the prosecution admitted samples of the
47
defendant’s handwriting into evidence. On appeal, the defendant alleged
that admitting his handwriting sample violated his Fifth Amendment
48
rights. The Court found that, although handwriting and speaking were
modes of communicating, it did not follow that every compulsion of an
accused to demonstrate his voice or handwriting compelled
49
communication. The defendant in Gilbert did not claim that the
handwriting sample’s content was testimonial, and the Court held that “a
mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written,
like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic”
50
outside the purview of the Fifth Amendment.
From Holt through Wade, Gilbert, and Schmerber, the Court has
drawn a distinction between evidence that communicates content and
evidence that is a physical characteristic used to identify the accused.
Despite this seemingly clear rule, however, determining what evidence is
privileged under the Fifth Amendment is not always simple. The Court
addressed the substantial gray area between physical and testimonial
51
evidence more recently in Pennsylvania v. Muniz. There, the Court held
that the slurred speech of a defendant who had been pulled over for
allegedly driving drunk was not privileged under the Fifth Amendment
52
and was admissible without Miranda warnings. As in Wade, where a
defendant was compelled to reveal the properties of his voice by speaking
53
in front of witnesses, the Court in Muniz found that the slurred speech
and lack of muscular coordination revealed by the defendant’s responses
54
to questions were not testimonial components of those responses. The

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

388 U.S. at 220–21.
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 222–23.
388 U.S. at 266.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266–67.
See generally 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
Id. at 590.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23.
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590–91.
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Court drew a bright line between the manner in which a defendant speaks,
which is neither testimonial nor entitled to protection under the Fifth
55
Amendment, and the content of his speech, which is protected. Thus, in
order to determine whether evidence is physical or testimonial, we must
look to whether the evidence is being offered to identify the defendant or
to prove that the defendant communicated something in particular.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment protects
56
“an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take,” when
57
they relate to “express or implied assertions of fact or belief.” In Doe v.
United States (Doe II), the Court addressed a circuit split and defined
58
testimonial evidence protected by the Fifth Amendment. In that case,
the defendant was issued a court order to sign a consent form that would
authorize two foreign banks to disclose whether he had accounts with
59
them. The defendant contended that the directive violated his Fifth
60
Amendment right against self-incrimination. In Doe II, however, the
Court found that the directive did not implicate the Fifth Amendment
because it merely authorized the bank to provide information and did
61
not compel the defendant to disclose “any knowledge he might have.”
The Court distinguished between requiring a defendant to authorize a
third party to disclose information and requiring the defendant himself to
reveal that information. In order for a defendant to successfully claim
that evidence is testimonial, the evidence must expressly or impliedly
disclose the defendant’s knowledge or beliefs.
Similarly in Muniz, the defendant was asked a series of questions
62
during a field sobriety test. The Court determined that physical
manifestations of his responses—including slurred speech and lack of
63
muscle coordination—were not testimonial, yet it held that the content
64
of his responses was testimonial. For example, the accused was asked if
55. Id. at 592.
56. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966).
57. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) (citing Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594–98); see Hiibel
v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (quoting Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201,
210 (1988)).
58. 487 U.S. at 219. Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Fifth Circuit, along with the
Second and Eleventh Circuits, held that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by a court order
compelling consent to the disclosure of foreign bank records. See In re Doe, No. 86-2663, 812 F.2d
1404 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 201; United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1039–40 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 1984). Conversely, a divided panel of
the First Circuit held that such an order violates the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 814 F.2d 791, 793–96 (1st Cir. 1987).
59. Doe II, 487 U.S. at 203.
60. Id. at 207.
61. Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967)).
62. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 585 (1990).
63. Id. at 592.
64. Id. at 598.
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he knew the date of his sixth birthday, and the Court found that the “the
trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (that he did not know the
65
proper date) that his mental state was confused.” The Court made an
important distinction between the physical characteristics of Muniz’s
speech and its content in determining what was protected under the Fifth
Amendment: “The correct question for present purposes is whether the
incriminating inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial
66
act or from physical evidence.” The Court in Muniz stated that the
blood test in Schmerber fell outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment
“not simply because the evidence concerned the suspect’s physical body,
but rather because the evidence was obtained in a manner that did not
67
entail any testimonial act on the part of the suspect.”
Conversely, the defendant in Muniz was posed a question to which
he formed a response. Relying on the line of cases that culminated in
Doe II, the Court found that
[t]he Schmerber line of cases does not draw a distinction between
unprotected evidence sought for its physical characteristics and
protected evidence sought for its [other] content. Rather, the Court
distinguished between the suspect’s being compelled himself to serve
as evidence and the suspect’s being compelled to disclose or
communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to
68
incriminating evidence.

Thus in Muniz, privilege under the Fifth Amendment turned not on
whether the defendant’s impaired faculties could “be characterized as an
aspect of his physiology, but rather whether Muniz’s response to the sixth
birthday question that gave rise to the inference of such an impairment
69
was testimonial in nature.” Because this question compelled Muniz to
disclose his knowledge—or lack thereof—a fact, it fell squarely within
the definition promulgated by the Court in Doe II and was found to be
70
privileged. The Court ordered Muniz’s response suppressed, vacated
the Pennsylvania state court’s decision, and remanded for a new trial
71
consistent with the Court’s holding.
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to prohibit the state from
72
extracting “self-condemnation.” In Curcio v. United States, the Court
noted that the privilege was implicated when the government attempted

65. Id. at 592 (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 593.
67. Id. (emphasis omitted).
68. Id. at 594 n.7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 211
n.10 (1988)).
69. Id. at 593–94.
70. Id. at 594–95.
71. Id. at 605–06.
72. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).

Boundy_23 (S. Alessi) (Do Not Delete)

August 2012]

8/14/2012 2:23 PM

THE GOVERNMENT CAN READ YOUR MIND

1637
73

to compel an accused “to disclose the contents of his own mind.” In Doe
II, the Court found that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment is satisfied
“when the privilege is asserted to spare the accused from having to
reveal, directly or indirectly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the
offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the
74
Government.” Even tests that are designed to measure involuntary
physiological responses to interrogation may actually elicit results that
are testimonial, and those must be afforded Fifth Amendment
75
protection. This recognition by the Court opens up other non-verbal
forms of communication to protection under the Fifth Amendment.
In two cases involving document subpoenas, United States v. Doe
(Doe I) and Fisher v. United States, the Court recognized that the act of
producing subpoenaed documents, not in and of itself the making of a
76
statement, might nonetheless invoke the Fifth Amendment. Citing both
Doe I and Fisher, the Court concluded in Doe II that, “by producing
documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that
the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were
77
authentic,” and in doing so would make an implicit statement of fact.
Thus, the Court stated “that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self78
incrimination applies [equally] to acts that imply assertions of fact.”
More recently, in United States v. Hubbell, the Court held that, separate
from the content of the document in question, the relevant compelled
testimony was “the testimony inherent in the act of producing those
79
documents.” Following the line of reasoning established in Doe I and
Doe II, Fisher, and Schmerber, the Court in Hubbell also recognized that
a defendant’s reaction to a subpoena constitutes testimony because it
implies that the defendant knows about the existence of the documents
80
in question.
Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasize the act of
disclosing testimonial evidence. Hubbell does not establish a test for
determining whether evidence is testimonial based on the process of

73. 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
74. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988).
75. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The Court, in dicta, discussed the
admissibility of polygraph tests and noted that the involuntary physiological reaction was inextricably
tied to the communicative nature of the evidence. Although polygraph tests have generally fallen into
disrepute, Schmerber exemplifies the Court’s willingness to protect evidence that comprises both a
communicative and physical response. Id.
76. United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
394, 396 (1976).
77. Doe II, 487 U.S at 209.
78. Id.
79. 530 U.S. 27, 40 (2000).
80. Id. at 34–35.
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gathering the information. Hubbell, along with Fisher and Doe I, only
stands for the proposition that testimonial evidence is not limited to
verbal utterances. As the Court stated in Schmerber, the Fifth
Amendment protects testimonial communications, “whatever form they
81
might take.” Further, as noted in Muniz, “nonverbal conduct contains a
testimonial component whenever the conduct reflects the actor’s
82
communication of his thoughts to another.” What emerges from these
cases is a definition of testimonial evidence comprised of a response by
the accused that expressly or implicitly discloses his knowledge of facts.
Therefore, the definition of testimonial evidence is not limited to speech or
even to active, voluntary disclosures. If the definition of testimonial were
“active” or “voluntary” disclosure of knowledge or belief, it would
conflate the first prong—testimonial—with the second prong—
compulsion—of the Supreme Court’s three-part test. This cannot be what
the Supreme Court intended for two reasons. First, because testimonial
evidence offered voluntarily, even if incriminating, does not always require
83
Miranda warnings. Second, because even when Miranda warnings are
properly administered, the Fifth Amendment still prohibits the admission
84
of coerced or compelled testimony.
The essential analysis to determine whether the content of fMRI
brain scans is testimony and thus privileged under the Fifth Amendment
is whether the content discloses the subject’s “express or implied
85
assertions of facts or beliefs.” fMRI brain scans cannot be categorized
as physical evidence because the images the scans create are not mere
“identifying characteristics.” Rather, fMRI brain scan results
communicate the mental reaction of the subject to particular stimuli in
86
real time. Physical changes in the oxygenation of blood in the brain in
response to these stimuli cannot be separated from the information they
81. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763–64 (1966). “A nod or head-shake is as much a
‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ act in this sense as are spoken words.” Id. at 761 n.5.
82. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595 n.9 (1990).
83. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297–298 (1990) (holding that an inmate’s voluntary disclosure
of incriminating evidence to an undercover police officer he believed to be a fellow inmate did not
violate the requirements of Miranda); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (stating that
outside of a custodial interrogation, volunteered “statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the] holding today”).
84. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (noting that even after
Miranda, the voluntariness of a confession is an issue of due process, determined by assessing the
totality of the circumstances), with Oregon v. Elstad, 467 U.S. 649, 670 (1984) (“Despite the fact that
patently voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the prosecution's
case, the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for impeachment purposes on crossexamination.”).
85. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 35 (citing Muniz, 496 U.S. at 594–98).
86. fMRI scans, which reveal mental reactions in real time, do not expose a mere “stagnant
physical characteristic but a dynamic process whose unfolding communicates information.” Holloway,
supra note 15, at 170.
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convey. Without the subject’s response, the fMRI scan would have
nothing to reveal. Prior to this technology, the information the fMRI
discloses would have been invisible and unobtainable unless affirmatively
disclosed by the subject. By revealing a measure of the interior workings of
the subject’s brain, however, fMRI brain scans force the subject to take
“the mental and physical steps necessary to provide . . . incriminating
88
evidence.” Technology has advanced beyond the roughly hewn categories
of “testimonial” and “physical” used to distinguish evidence protected by
the Fifth Amendment from evidence that may be properly compelled with
89
mere probable cause. That technology is blurring this line, however, does
not negate the fact that the fMRI scan communicates the subject’s
knowledge of facts. As the Court stated in Schmerber, to “compel a
person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine
his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth
90
Amendment.”
It is imperative that technology not outpace the fundamental
protections afforded the accused. Constitutional standards, such as those
provided by the Fifth Amendment, play a critical role in ensuring that
evidence admitted in court is reliable and that defendants receive a full
and fair trial. Advances in technology should not undermine these
cardinal policies of our criminal justice system. Rather than continue to
sort evidence into two bins, courts should consider whether the evidence is
a response by the accused that expressly or implicitly discloses his
knowledge of facts. If the answer to this question is yes, then the evidence
should be privileged under the Fifth Amendment and require Miranda
warnings to ensure that this evidence is not unwittingly surrendered.
B. Techniques of Persuasion
Compulsion is the second prong of the Supreme Court’s test for
91
determining whether evidence is afforded Fifth Amendment protection.

87. Id. at 172–73.
88. Id. at 172 (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42).
89. “There will be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests
seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence,’ for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in
body function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are
essentially testimonial. . . . Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege
is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966) (internal citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. The Court laid the framework for this test in Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 207
(1987). The Court has since applied it consistently when analyzing whether evidence is testimonial in
nature and thus privileged under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542
U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to acts that
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In Miranda, the Supreme Court noted that evidence obtained while an
individual is in police custody is presumed to have been compelled in the
absence of prophylactic constitutional safeguards because of the
“antagonistic forces” and “techniques of persuasion” frequently used in
92
custodial interrogations. The admissibility of evidence obtained after a
person indicates he does not want to be interrogated turns on whether
93
his request was “scrupulously honored.” In fact, if an individual
indicates that he does not want to answer the government’s questions, he
94
must not be interrogated. Compulsion is also found where, considering
the circumstances of the interrogation, the free will of the witness has
95
been oppressed.
Today, fMRI brain scans are not portable and would presumably be
administered only after an accused was in custody. Even though
measuring the subject’s mental response to stimuli with an fMRI scan is
analogous to asking questions, it is not the same as, for example, the
questions posed in Muniz and the defendant’s verbal responses. In order
to analyze the applicability of the compulsion prong of the Court’s threeprong test, we must determine if and when a brain scan constitutes
custodial interrogation. In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court addressed the
96
meaning of “interrogation” under Miranda v. Arizona. In Miranda, the
Court concluded that, in the context of custodial interrogation, certain
procedural safeguards are necessary to protect an accused’s Fifth and
97
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In that case, the Court broadly defined
interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
98
freedom of action in any significant way.” However, in Innis, the Court
noted that the Miranda Court had been concerned not just with express
questioning, but with “the ‘interrogation environment’ . . . [that] would
‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby
99
undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.”

imply assertions of fact.”); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34–38 (2000) (“[T]o be testimonial,
an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information.”).
92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“One
of [the Fifth Amendment’s] purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological
domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him
of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”).
93. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
94. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
95. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 544 (1961)).
96. 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980).
97. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
98. Id. at 444.
99. 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58).
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The Innis Court defined interrogation while in custody as involving
either express questioning or the “functional equivalent” where police or
government conduct is “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
100
response.” In Innis, the conversation between officers that resulted in
the accused’s statements did not fit either definition of interrogation, and
the Court noted specifically that the officers’ remarks were in no way
101
designed to elicit a response. Conversely, fMRI brain scans are intricate
machines that are designed expressly to elicit a subject’s response to
stimuli. Furthermore, fMRI brain scans disclose the reaction of a subject to
particular stimuli and are therefore the functional equivalent of an
interrogation. The scans are “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response” and thus should be subjected, like all custodial interrogations, to
102
the procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda.
The Court in Innis was quick to note that not all statements of an
accused while in custody are considered the product of interrogation and
reaffirmed that statements given freely and voluntarily are admissible in
evidence in the absence of Miranda warnings. Still, given the nuance of
fMRI brain scan technology and the rarity of its current use, the
government should take extra care to ensure the safeguards provided by
103
Miranda are met. Thus, special care should be taken to ensure that
consent to fMRI brain scans meets the requirements of Miranda and the
information disclosed by the results is in fact freely and voluntarily given.
One of the central purposes of the Fifth Amendment is “to prevent the
state, whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming
the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of
the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his
104
Although the privilege was historically a protection
conviction.”
against the use of torture and threats, advancements in technology like
fMRI brain scans implicate the same constitutional problems. In essence,
the brain scan removes an accused’s ability to refrain from disclosing his
responses to questioning. Once he is in the machine, his response to such
stimuli—that is, his testimony—is revealed. He no longer possesses the
freedom to decide whether to assist the state; he cannot divert the flow of
blood within his brain or mask the information it reveals. Thus brain scan

100. Id. at 302.
101. Id. at 303 n.9.
102. Id. at 301.
103. The scarcity of the technology of fMRI brain scans and the recognition of the human mind as
an “inviolab[le],” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460, “private inner sanctum,” Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327 (1973), is reminiscent of the Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). In
Kyllo, the Court found that thermal imaging of a home using advanced technology constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment because of the rarity of the technology in use and because of the
inherent privacy interest in a person’s home. 533 U.S. at 39–40.
104. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
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administration procedures must meet the highest standards of consent in
order to avoid infringing upon a person’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Specifically, the subject should be made fully aware of the capacity of the
machine to reveal what he would choose to hide and, knowing that, given
the opportunity to refuse the test.
For example, consider whether an accused can consent to an fMRI
brain scan without an attorney present. Traditionally, an accused’s
constitutional right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of criminal
105
proceedings against him. However, “when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its
purpose is to elicit a confession . . . the accused must be permitted to
106
consult with his lawyer.” Furthermore, an individual’s failure to make
an explicit request for a lawyer while in police custody does not waive his
107
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The extension of the right to
counsel in certain pretrial situations, such as interrogation in police
custody, recognizes that the results of the confrontation may determine
108
an accused’s guilt and reduce the trial to a mere formality. Given the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the right to counsel “embodies a
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does
109
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself,” the fMRI scan
may be one instance that necessitates the presence of counsel to ensure
that the capacity of the test is not downplayed and consent is real. In
weighing fundamental constitutional rights against the government’s
need to effectively investigate crimes, it is imperative that the
constitutional and procedural safeguards that protect verbal testimony
are available to protect testimony that is disclosed via advances in
technology such as those revealed by fMRI brain scans.
C. A Link in the Chain
To activate the protections of the Fifth Amendment, the testimony
110
the accused is compelled to disclose must be incriminating. Incriminating
evidence provides “a link in the chain” of evidentiary support needed to
111
prosecute an individual for a crime. Evidence is incriminating within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment if it significantly enhances the likelihood

105. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688–89 (1972).
106. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
107. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
108. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 224 (1967)).
109. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
110. Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
111. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
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of prosecution or if it facilitates conviction. In Miranda, the Court noted
that the Fifth Amendment privilege “protects the individual from being
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish
113
Incriminating evidence need not be
degrees of incrimination.”
condemning; in fact, the government may use seemingly innocuous
responses from an innocent party against that person, and such responses
114
would still be entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.
Given the broad definition of “incriminating,” it is likely that nearly
every fMRI brain scan will satisfy the incriminating element of the
Court’s three-prong test for testimonial evidence. For example, fMRI
brain scans have the ability to disclose that a subject has knowledge of a
particular place or person by revealing increased blood flow to the
brain’s memory center in response to images of that person or place. If
the scan’s results indicate that the subject has knowledge of a particular
fact, and that fact furnishes an evidentiary link to the issue at trial, it
satisfies the incriminating prong. Thus it is not that fMRI scans can
divulge our darkest secrets, it is that they can reveal what we know and
recognize, which may be all that the government is looking for.

Conclusion
fMRI brain scanning is a complex and nuanced technology that
tracks, in real time, the subject’s responses to pictures or facts. This
technology removes the subject’s ability to exercise his constitutional
right to end an interrogation once a question has been asked because no
affirmative or voluntary action on the part of the subject is needed for
the fMRI to record his response. Thus, the technology is invasive enough
to disclose the subject’s responses and knowledge against her volition.
Before this technology existed, the type of information fMRI brain scans
disclose would have been invisible and unobtainable unless voluntarily
and affirmatively disclosed by the subject. Further, the subject would
have been free to terminate the interrogation at any time, particularly in
response to a question that the subject did not want to answer. In
measuring the subject’s mental response, an fMRI brain scan forces the
subject to take the “mental and physical steps necessary” to provide the
government with incriminating evidence, regardless of whether a subject
wishes to respond to the question or to invoke his right against self115
incrimination. Because of the invasiveness of this technology, it is
112. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
113. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
114. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421
(1957)) (“[O]ne of the Fifth Amendment’s ‘basic functions . . . is to protect innocent men . . . who
otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’” (emphasis omitted)).
115. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 42 (2000).
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imperative that any use be subject to the most stringent procedural
safeguards.
fMRI brain scan results must be considered privileged evidence
protected by an individual’s Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness
against himself. fMRI brain scans disclose the contents of the subject’s
mind and allow the government to extract self-incriminating knowledge
without having to derive that information independently. The
admissibility of fMRI brain scans, if found reliable, should turn on
whether the scan is compelled by the government. Holding otherwise
would enable the government to invade the inner sanctum of an
individual’s mind and strip citizens of a fundamental constitutional
protection. The government can read our minds, and the Constitution
should protect us.

